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Key Concepts for Informed Choices 
A consortium of researchers lays out a framework for critical thinking about claims, 
comparisons and choices.  
 
Whether interventions are proposed by advertisers, agony aunts, or others, they are almost 
always accompanied by claims about their effects – both wished for and unwanted. Claims 
are made across a huge range of proposed interventions, from those to tackle global threats 
like climate change to treatments for a child’s sore throat. Unfortunately, people often fail to 
think critically about the trustworthiness of the claims made, including those made by 
scientists. When they do try to think critically about claims, they may struggle to assess 
whether the supporting evidence is trustworthy.  And as a consequence, they may not make 
well-informed choices.  
Most people believe that critical thinking skills are important and that schools do not do 
enough to prepare young people to think critically 1. As a contribution to addressing this 
deficit we have drawn on the expertise of two dozen researchers to adapt a framework 
developed for use in healthcare 2 (Box 1) to try to create a more general tool - Key Concepts 
for Informed Choices (Table 1) - designed to help people think critically about intervention 
claims. We hope this will provide a starting point for people working across fields to design 
and evaluate effective ways to teach the Key Concepts, communicate research findings, and 
support well-informed choices. To ensure that citizens, professionals, and policymakers use 
the best available evidence to make decisions, we call on scientists and professionals in all 
fields that promote interventions to use and adapt these Key Concepts. Ideally, the Key 
Concepts for Informed Choices should be embedded in education for citizens of all ages.  
Trustworthy evidence  
People are already flooded with information, so simply giving them more of it is unlikely to 
be helpful unless its value is understood. A recent survey in the UK showed that only about a 
third of the public trust evidence from medical research, while about two-thirds trust the 
experiences of friends and family 3.  
Not all evidence is created equal. Yet people often don’t appreciate which claims are more 
trustworthy than others; what sort of comparisons are needed to evaluate different proposed 
interventions fairly; or what other information needs to be considered to inform good choices. 
For example, many people continue to fail to recognise that outcomes can be associated with 
an intervention without necessarily being caused by it. The media sometimes perpetuates this 
problem by using language suggesting that cause-and-effect has been established when it 
hasn’t 4, using statements such as “coffee can kill you”, or “drinking one glass of beer a day 
can make you live longer”. Journalists aren’t the only ones at fault here; such exaggerated 
causal claims often originate in similarly exaggerated claims made in university and journal 
press releases 5. 
Studies that compare different interventions fairly are vital to amassing trustworthy evidence, 
yet people often don’t know how to assess study validity. Syntheses (also called systematic 
reviews) of well-designed studies relevant to clearly-defined questions are more trustworthy 




the play of chance (random errors). Yet results from single studies are often reported in 
isolation, as facts. This results in confusing, flip-flopping headlines in newspapers such as  
“chocolate is good for you”, followed a week later by a headline declaring that “chocolate is 
bad for you”.  
To make good choices, other types of information in addition to research evidence are 
needed— for example, about costs and feasibility. Judgements must also be made about the 
relevance of information from research (its applicability or transferability), and about the 
balance between the likely desirable and undesirable effects of interventions. For example, 
there is substantial variation in the design of carbon taxes, including the tax rate, the tax base, 
the use of the tax revenues, and exemptions. In addition to considering evidence from 
evaluations of the effects of carbon taxes and making judgements about the validity and 
applicability of that evidence, policymakers need to make judgements about administrative 
difficulties, the distribution of tax burdens across income groups, and acceptability in their 
jurisdictions.    
Examples illustrating the key concepts for claims, comparisons and choices are shown in Box 
2. 
Critical thinking 
Individuals and organisations across a wide variety of fields are working to enable people to 
make evidence-informed decisions. These efforts include synthesizing the best available 
evidence in systematic reviews; making it more accessible, for example, by preparing plain 
language summaries and removing paywalls; and teaching people to make evidence-informed 
choices. For example, international organisations such as the Cochrane Collaboration, the 
Campbell Collaboration, and the Collaboration for Environmental Evidence produce and 
promote the use of systematic reviews. Organisations such as the International Society for 
evidence-Based Health Care, the Center for Evidence-Based Management, the Africa Centre 
for Evidence, and the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation promote the generation 
and use of research evidence to inform decision-making internationally; and organisations 
such as the What Works Centres in the UK encourage and enable the use of research 
evidence within countries. But academics in this sphere tend to work in silos within their own 
fields, sometimes missing opportunities to learn from others. In this article we have drawn on 
the expertise of co-authors working in 14 different fields: agriculture, economics, education, 
environmental management, international development, healthcare, informal learning, 
management, nutrition, planetary health, policing, social welfare, speech and language 
therapy, and veterinary medicine.  
We have identified many key concepts that apply across fields (Table 1), and some that were 
more relevant in some fields than others (Table 2). For example, it is often important to 
consider potential placebo effects when assessing claims about medical treatments and 
nutrition, but these are rarely important when assessing claims about the effects of 
interventions on the environment. 
Our collaboration has already prompted the co-authors of this article to develop more specific 
frameworks for their respective fields and to suggest improvements to the original Informed 
Health Choices framework 2. There is power in identifying an issue that resonates across 




The Key Concepts for Informed Choices should not be seen as a simple checklist for critical 
thinking, but as a starting point for identifying and developing resources to help people to 
understand and apply important concepts. Although we have organised the Key Concepts in 
three groups (claims, comparisons and choices), the list can be used to develop learning 
resources that include any combination of the concepts, presented in any order. We hope it 
will prove useful to those helping others to think critically about what to believe and what to 
do, including those teaching critical thinking and those responsible for communicating 
research findings.   
There has been a groundswell of calls for evidence-based or evidence-informed decisions 
within and across fields over the past few decades, as evidenced, for example, by over 80,000 
references in Google Scholar with “evidence based” in the title, and over 75 million hits for a 
Google search for “evidence based”.  Evidence-informed practice is now explicitly taught to 
professionals in many different fields, and it is important that these efforts should continue. 
However, it is also important that the Key Concepts be taught to school children, rather than 
delaying acquisition of this knowledge until adulthood. Children who have been explicitly 
taught critical thinking make better judgements than children who have not been helped to 
acquire these skills 6. Early education helps to set an important foundation for teaching time-
pressed adults to think critically about interventions. 
An important part of the work of encouraging critical thinking is learning and sharing 
strategies for promoting healthy scepticism while avoiding unintended consequences. 
Possible unwanted consequences include inducing nihilism; allowing for disingenuous claims 
that uncertainty is a defensible argument against acting on climate change; or encouraging 
false beliefs that competing interests renders all research untrustworthy.  
Competing interests take different forms in different fields, but the challenges and remedies 
are similar across fields: recognition of competing interests, transparency, and independent 
evaluations. Achieving these depends on improved public understanding of the need for 
evaluation, and public demand for investment in independent evaluation, as well as unbiased 
communication evaluation findings. 
Further development and specialization of the Key Concepts for Informed Choices is needed, 
and we welcome suggestions. To facilitate further development, we have created a website 
(www.thatsaclaim.org) where the Key Concepts can be adapted to different fields and target 
audiences, translated to other languages, and linked to learning resources. 
References 
1. Bouygues, H.L. The State of Critical Thinking: A New Look at Reasoning at Home, 
School, and Work. (Reboot Foundation, 2018). https://reboot-foundation.org/research_/  
2. Oxman AD, Chalmers I & Austvoll-Dahlgren A. Key Concepts for assessing claims 
about treatment effects and making well-informed treatment choices. F1000Research 7, 
1784 (2018). 
3. Academy of Medical Sciences. Enhancing the use of scientific evidence to judge the 
potential benefits and harms of medicines (Academy of Medical Sciences, 2017). 
https://acmedsci.ac.uk/file-download/44970096 
4. Haber, N. et al. Causal language and strength of inference in academic and media articles 




5. Sumner, P. et al. Exaggerations and caveats in press releases and health-related science 
news. PLoS One 11, e0168217 (2016). 
6. Abrami, P.C., et al. Strategies for teaching students to think critically: a meta-analysis. 
Rev Educ Res. 85, 275–314 (2015). 
 
 
Box 1. The Informed Health Choices Project 
The Key Concepts for Informed Choices are based in part on the work of the Informed 
Health Choices (IHC) Project.  This was initially developed between 2012 and 2017 by a 
collaboration including co-authors of this comment (Andy Oxman, Astrid Dahlgren, Iain 
Chalmers, and Matt Oxman). That project’s ongoing goal is to help people assess 
healthcare claims and make well-informed health choices. It has developed learning 
resources based on the IHC Key Concepts 2, and a database of multiple-choice questions to 
assess how well users can apply the concepts. In 2016, a randomized trial involving 120 
schools and over 10,000 school children in Uganda showed an important effect on the 
ability of 10 to 12 year-old children to apply 12 of the Key Concepts 7, for example, 
recognising that personal experiences or the opinions of experts alone are an unreliable 
basis for claims about the effects of treatments; that evaluating the effects of treatments 
requires appropriate comparisons and that small studies can be misleading; and that 
treatment decisions require judgements about the balance between the expected benefits 
and harms. In the intervention schools, 3967 (69%) of 5753 children achieved a 
predetermined passing score (≥13 of 24 correct answers) compared with 1186 (27%) of 
4430 children in the control schools (adjusted 










Box 2. Examples 
Claims 
Key Concept: Beliefs alone about how interventions work are not reliable predictors of the 
presence or size of effects of intervention. 
Most people would intuitively say that it is hard to influence parents’ engagement with 
their children’s education. The common-sense assumption is therefore that more intensive 
(and more costly) interventions would be more likely to be effective. However, studies of 
intensive interventions have often failed to show effects on pupils’ attainment, as measured 
with standard tests 8. Meanwhile, a recent evaluation of the effects of simply texting 
parents weekly with updates about their child’s schooling had positive effects on children’s 
attendance, homework submission, and mathematics attainment 9. These effects were 
small, but the cost was very low. These examples illustrate that - contrary to intuitive 
reasoning - inexpensive interventions can be helpful, and expensive ones can fail. 
Comparisons 
Key Concept: Comparison groups (or conditions) should be as similar as possible. 
“Scared Straight” programmes take young offenders on prison visits on the assumption that 
this experience and listening to inmates’ descriptions of life in prison will deter juvenile 
delinquency. Before-after comparisons found that the prison visits were followed by large 
reductions in delinquent behaviour. But a lot can change within a group of youngsters over 
time, including becoming older and more mature. Without comparable comparison groups 
it is hard to know whether these before-after comparisons were fair comparisons. Fairer 
comparisons of prison visits were done in which youths were randomly assigned either to 
visit prison or not to visit prison, thus creating groups of youths who were comparable in 
characteristics other than prison visits. Comparisons between these two groups showed 
greater subsequent delinquent behaviour in the youngsters who had been exposed to 
prisons 10, 11. 
Choices 
Key Concept: When there are important uncertainties about the effects of interventions, 
those uncertainties should be reduced by (further) fair comparisons. 
“Pay for performance” refers to the transfer of money or material goods conditional on 
taking a measurable action or achieving a predetermined performance target. This is also 
sometimes referred to as results-based financing, performance-based funding and output-
based aid. These policies are promoted as an important tool for improving the delivery of 
effective health care and the effectiveness of development aid, and motivating patients to 
comply with recommended health interventions. However, there is substantial uncertainty 
about the beneficial and adverse effects of paying for performance, particularly in low- and 
middle-income countries 12. Decisions to implement these schemes should therefore 
include rigorous evaluation of both intended effects on performance and unintended 
effects, such as excluding high risk people from care in order to obtain better performance, 
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Key Concepts for Informed Choices 
  
Claims  
Claims about the effects of interventions 
should be supported by evidence from fair 
comparisons. Claims that are not supported 
by such evidence are not necessarily wrong, 
but there is an insufficient basis for believing 
them.  
Comparisons  
Studies assessing interventions should be 
fair comparisons, designed to minimize the 
risk of systematic errors (biases) and random 
errors (the play of chance). 
Choices  
Well-informed choices about what to do 
depend on judgements about the problem, 
the relevance (applicability or 
transferability) of the available evidence, 
and the balance of expected benefits, harms 
and costs.  
Claims should not assume that 
interventions are completely safe, 
effective, or certain.  
• Interventions can cause harms as well as 
benefits.  
• Large, dramatic effects of interventions 
are rare.  
• We can rarely, if ever, be completely 
certain about the effects of 
interventions.  
Seemingly logical assumptions are not 
a sufficient basis for claims.  
• Beliefs alone about how interventions 
work are not reliable predictors of the 
presence or size of intervention effects.  
• An outcome may be associated with an 
intervention but not caused by it.  
• More data is not necessarily better data.  
• The results of a single study considered 
in isolation can be misleading.  
• Widely used interventions or 
interventions that have been used for 
decades are not necessarily beneficial or 
safe.  
• Interventions that are new or 
technologically impressive may not be 
better than available alternatives.  
• Increasing the amount of an 
intervention does not necessarily 
increase its benefits and may cause 
harm.  
Trust in a source alone is not a 
sufficient basis for believing a claim.  
• Competing interests may result in 
misleading claims about the effects of 
interventions.  
• Personal experiences or anecdotes 
(stories) alone are an unreliable basis for 
most claims.  
• Opinions of experts, authorities, 
celebrities, or other respected 
individuals do not alone provide a 
reliable basis for claims.  
• Peer review and publication by a journal 
do not guarantee that comparisons have 
been fair. 
 
Comparisons of interventions should 
be fair.  
• Comparison groups (or conditions) 
should be as similar as possible.  
• Indirect comparisons of interventions 
(comparing across different studies) can 
be misleading.  
• The people, groups or conditions being 
compared should be treated similarly, 
apart from the interventions being 
studied. 
• Outcomes should be assessed in the 
same way in the groups or conditions 
being compared.  
• Outcomes should be assessed using 
methods that have been shown to be 
reliable.  
• It is important to assess outcomes in all 
(or nearly all) the people or subjects in a 
study.  
• When random allocation is used, 
people’s or subjects’ outcomes should 
be counted in the group to which they 
were allocated.  
Reviews (syntheses) of studies should 
be reliable.  
• Reviews of studies comparing 
interventions should use systematic 
methods. 
• Failure to consider unpublished results 
of fair comparisons may result in biased 
estimates of effects. 
• Comparisons of interventions may be 
sensitive to underlying assumptions.  
Descriptions of the effects of 
interventions should clearly reflect the 
size of effects and the risk of being 
misled by the play of chance.  
• Verbal descriptions alone of the size of 
effects can be misleading.  
• Small studies may be misleading.  
• Confidence intervals should be reported 
for estimates of effects.  
• Deeming results to be “statistically 
significant” or “nonsignificant” can be 
misleading.  
• Lack of evidence of a difference is not 
the same as evidence of “no difference”.  
 
What is the problem (or what are the 
goals) and what are the options?  
It is important that   
• the problem is diagnosed or described 
correctly; and  
• the goals and options are acceptable 
and feasible.  
Is the available evidence of the effects 
of the options relevant?  
• Attention should focus on important, 
not surrogate, outcomes.  
The results of studies may not be applicable 
or transferable if  
• the people or subjects in studies are 
very different from those of interest;  
• the interventions compared are very 
different from those of interest; or  
• the circumstances in which the 
interventions were compared are very 
different from those of interest.  
Do the expected benefits and savings 
outweigh the expected harms and 
costs?  
• Decisions about interventions should 
not be based on considering only their 
benefits.  
Additional considerations include  
• potential harms;  
• what opportunities we give up by using 
resources to provide an intervention; 
• baseline risks;   
• how the benefits, harms, and costs are 
valued;  
• the distribution of the benefits, harms 
and costs (when more than one person 
or subject is affected); and  
• certainty about an intervention’s 
benefits, harms, and costs.  
 
• When there are important uncertainties 
about the effects of interventions, those 
uncertainties should be reduced by 
(further) fair comparisons. 
 
 
